Wind power has a strong position at the Danish electricity market, mainly caused by high feed-in tariffs in the 1990s. Investments in new wind-power installations on land, however, have declined dramatically after the Danish electricity market was liberalised in 1999. First, the paper describes how policy measures directed towards wind power have been redesigned to match the liberalised market. Then, we estimate the impact of the redesigned tariffs on the electricity prices. Finally, we assess whether the new tariffs make an incentive to invest in wind power. The paper concludes that the new tariffs not by itself make evidence for the actual Danish recession in new wind-power installations after the electricity reform. The main causes could include a combination of problems in spatial planning, high risk aversion of new wind turbine investors and perhaps more favourable support schemes in other countries.
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Background
At the beginning of 2007 the Danish Government presented a new long-term energy strategy focusing on energy conservation, renewable technologies and research and demonstration of new energy technologies. 1 The share of renewable energy is targeted to increase to 30% of the gross energy consumption by 2025-almost a doubling of the present level. Wind power is expected to be a main contributor and a doubling of wind-power capacity from present 3129 MW (January 2006; www.ens.dk) to 6000 MW is included in the strategy as an example. Compared to the speed in present wind-power development this target seems to be quite ambitious. Investments in new wind turbine installations on land have declined radically after the Danish Electricity Reform was decided in 1999. The reform implied a liberalisation of the Danish electricity market as from January 2000 and a redesign of the support to wind-power producers from a pre-reform high feed-in tariff uniform to all wind-power installations to different tariffs distinguishing between old/new and on land/off shore windpower installations (Meyer and Kofoed, 2003) . The redesigned tariffs aim to eliminate or reduce the support to wind power over a transition period leading to a Nordpool electricity market scenario.
The electricity reform had a remarkable impact on Danish wind-power development, see Fig. 1 . Fig. 1 illustrates a peak in wind-power installations in 2000 where approximately 600 MW wind-power capacity was installed. Investments reached bottom in 2004, when no wind turbines were installed under the transition programme. 2 The peak in 2000 reflects the redesign of policy measures in 1999, which gave an incentive to speed up wind-power projects in order to maintain the high feed-in tariff for investment carried out under the 1999 transition programme, see Section 2.1. The wind turbines were simply bought in 1999 and installed in 2000. Some offshore wind projects have been carried through by the power companies after 2000, and the recession in the development of land-based wind power has been partly offset by a repowering scheme on targeting small and inefficient wind-power installations on land.
The conflict between the actual recession in Danish windpower development and the ambitious political goals for future renewable energy development points to a need for assessing whether the redesigned tariffs make an incentive to invest in new wind-power installations.
On this background the aims of the paper are: First, to investigate how policy measures directed towards wind power have been redesigned after the liberalisation of the Danish electricity market. Second, to estimate the influence of the new tariffs on electricity prices paid by Danish consumers and the influence on producer profits and incentives as well. Third, we want to assess whether the present tariffs make incentives to invest in wind power.
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The structure in the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the redesign of policy measures to support wind power in the liberalised Danish power market. In Section 3 we analyse the economic impacts of the measures with regard to the wind-power producer and the electricity consumer. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Policy measures to support wind power
Before the electricity reform a support scheme in the form of a general feed-in tariff was applied to wind-power producers. The feed-in tariff was partly related to the price of electricity (buyback rate) and partly including a governmental subsidy. As the power industry was not liberalised at that time, the power prices were fairly stable. Therefore, the feed-in tariff was fixed at approx. 8 ch/kWh, a significantly higher level than seen after the electricity reform.
3
The electricity reform maintains feed-in tariffs, but the tariffs are only applied for a restricted period of time. However, additional policy measures addressing wind power are included in the Danish electricity reform. The reform distinguishes between three categories of wind-power installations:
1. Old wind-power installations on land, i.e. installations connected to the grid before the electricity market was liberalised by January 2000. 2. New wind-power installations on land (connected to the grid after January 1, 2003). 3. New offshore wind power.
Old wind-power installations on land
Owners of old wind-power installations on land benefit from a transition programme as part of the electricity reform. 4 The programme aims to soothe the transition to market liberalisation by maintaining a high feed-in tariff for a transition period of approximately 10 years. Thereby private investors have a guarantee for a high payoff from investments made prior to the liberalisation of the electricity market. Wind turbines bought before January 2000 are covered by a general price guarantee of 8.05 ch/kWh for a 10-year production period. A part of the subsidy (2.3 ch/kWh) is restricted to a maximum production limit specified in full-load hours.
5 That part of the subsidy is conversely scaled to the installed capacity of the wind turbine, i.e. so that small and less efficient wind turbines receive a higher subsidy than bigger and more efficient wind turbines. A distinction is made between small (up to 200 kW capacity), medium (201-599 kW) and big (more than 600 kW) wind turbines. Size is only a relevant criterion for turbines established before 2000.
Wind turbines connected to the grid between 2000 and 2002 are covered by a feed-in tariff of 5.8 ch/kWh up to a production limit of 22.000 full-load hours. Thereafter, the owner receive a premium of 1.6 ch/kWh on top of the market price (including compensation for balancing costs of 0.3 ch/kWh) until the wind turbine has reached an age of 20 years.
New wind-power installations on land
Owners of wind turbines connected to the grid after January 2003 have to sell electricity to the market price. On top of the market price a general subsidy of 1.6 ch/kWh (including compensation for balancing costs of 0.3 ch/kWh) is offered for a 20-year period. If the spot price plus the premium exceed 4.8 ch/kWh the premium is lowered. From January 2005, the limit of 4.8 ch/kWh was removed.
In order to increase the capacity and efficiency of land-based wind turbines two repowering schemes targeting old privately owned wind turbines have been introduced after the electricity reform.
The first repowering scheme was initiated from 2001 to the end of 2003 targeting turbines up to a capacity of 150 kW. When decommissioning these small turbines, the owners got repowering certificates equivalent to an additional tariff of 2.3 ch/kWh for 2-3 times the scrapped capacity for 12,000 full-load hours. 6 Because these certificates could be traded the scheme made it possible to install much larger turbines and during the lifetime of the scheme 1480 small and old turbines with a total capacity of 122 MW were replaced by 272 new turbines having a total capacity of 324 MW (Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association, 2004) . The scheme was most effective for turbines in the capacity range 55-95 kW in which more than 80% of the turbines were decommissioned, whereas only 25% of the 150 kW turbines was decommissioned.
A second repowering scheme was decided in 2004 for the period of [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . This scheme was targeting bigger turbines having a capacity up to 450 kW. In this scheme the turbine owners get repowering certificates equivalent to 1.7 ch/kWh for two times the decommissioned capacity for 12,000 full-load hours (Danish Wind Turbine Owners Association, 2004) . Until now, this scheme has proven to be less successful than the first repowering scheme and as only very few MWs have been installed since the scheme was introduced. There seems to be several reasons. First, it is questionable if it is profitable to the owners to replace these larger 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 although the Danish Government urges them to point out appropriate sites. Finally, the repowering scheme includes a maximum at a total remuneration to wind-power producer of 6.4 ch/kWh, including spot price, environmental premium and repowering certificate. When the total payment exceeds this maximum, the value of the repowering certificate is reduced accordingly.
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New offshore wind power
Denmark has been an innovator in establishing offshore wind farms. The first offshore farm was installed in 1991 and planning efforts have been devoted to a comprehensive offshore development. At the end of 2007 eight offshore wind farms are in operation in Denmark having a total installed capacity of 400 MW as compared to a worldwide capacity of 1100 MW (BTM-consult 2006) .
The development of offshore wind power in Denmark is founded on a tendering procedure and a strong planning process initiated before the electricity reform (Langniss and Morthorst, 2003) . In autumn 2003 four specific offshore areas were selected as relevant for tendering. By applying a tendering procedure the government calls for competition among bidders in order to ensure a cost-effective wind-power development. The capacity of the wind farm is predetermined in the tendering requirements, while the size of the turbines is to be chosen by the winning investor. Thus, technical improvements, e.g. utilisation of larger turbines, can be fully exploited by the investor. A certain minimum expertise concerning the necessary technical and financial capacities of the applicants is required.
Offshore wind-power development in Denmark has been undertaken by private investors as well as power companies. Most of the existing Danish offshore capacity is established in accordance with an agreement between the Danish Government and the power companies. This goes for the two largest offshore wind farms constructed until now-Horns Reef I and Nysted I.
These two wind farms are guaranteed a feed-in tariff of 6.1 ch/ kWh (including compensation for balancing of 0.3 ch/kWh) up to a limit of 42,000 full-load hours. Additional electricity production will be traded according to the following tariff: Market spot price plus a premium of 1.3 ch/kWh 9 plus a balancing compensation of 0.3 ch/kWh until the wind farm has reached the age of 20.
Thereafter, only the spot price will be paid for the power production from the wind farms. A similar, but not quite identical, three-stage tariff structure is applied for privately established offshore wind farms (Middelgrunden and Samsø). In 2004 the Danish Government decided to establish two more large offshore wind farms: Horns Reef II and Nysted/ Rødsand II, close to the existing wind farms. To ensure market compatibility a tendering procedure was decided. This tendering was carried out in 2006 with the resulting tariff agreements as shown in Table 1 .
It appears from Table 1 that a general tariff structure including three stages is applied:
(1) A feed-in tariff (price guarantee) for approximately a 10-yearproduction period (period of full-load hours), (2) thereafter a partial adaptation to market price (market price+a premium) until year 20 of production (3) finally, a full adaptation to the market price.
Experience shows that no strong competition has been ensured by the tendering procedure. The rights to develop the Horns Reef II were given to the Danish company Energi E2 A/S, now merged into the Danish company Dong Energy. Besides Energi E2 A/S two more companies were bidding in the tendering process, Elsam Kraft A/S 10 and Horns Rev II A/S. Thus, tendering was a game including well-known actors from the Danish power industry. The rights to develop the Nysted-Rødsand II were won by a consortium consisting of Energy E2, E.ON Sverige AB and Dong Wind A/S. Since then the Danish power company Energy E2 has merged with the Danish energy company, DONG becoming DONG Energy. Then first DONG Energy withdrew from the Nysted/ Rødsand II project, leaving E.ON Sverige AB as the only partner. Finally, also E.ON Sverige AB withdrew from the project and a new tendering round will take place in the near future. Increased investment costs and better investment opportunities in other countries (e.g. in UK) were the background for the resignation of DONG.
When the above-shown tariffs are compared over a 20-year period, the tendering procedure comes up with approximately the same costs as those found for the exiting offshore wind farms. Thus, it seems that no real cost reductions have been reached by utilising the tendering procedure. However, this lack of cost reduction should be seen in the light of the experiences gained offshore in recent years, where it has proven more difficult to establish and operate the turbines than expected. Also it should be noticed that when the number of full-load hours has expired (after approximately 12 years) the tariff for the new offshore wind farms (Horns Reef II and Nysted/Rødsand II) will adapt to the market price.
In Denmark, offshore wind farms are thought of as part of the power system infrastructure. This implies that the costs of the offshore transformer station, the transmission cables to the shore, and eventually, any reinforcements of on land power infrastructure are to be covered by the transmission system operator (TSO) and not by the owner of the wind farm. Moreover, the TSO is paying the feed-in tariff to the wind-power producers and is collecting the revenue from the electricity customers.
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Tariff comparison
As demonstrated above the electricity reform has introduced different tariffs-or payment schemes-for Danish wind-power installations. In order to analyse the economics of the tariffs we define five cases of wind-power installations:
Case 1: Old wind-power installation on land. Privately owned 500 kW wind-power installation built before January 1, 2000. We assume the annual production to be 2061 kWh/kW.
11 Initially the owner receives a price of 8.05 ch/kWh for the first 15,000 full-load hours (flhs). After that the owner will receive 5.8 ch/kWh until the turbine is 10 years old. Thereafter, the owner has to adapt to the spot-market price.
Case 2: New wind-power installation on land. Privately owned 2 MW wind-power installation built after January 1, 2005. We assume the annual production to be 2326 kWh/kW.
11 Owners of new wind-power installations have to sell their own electricity production to the market. For 20 years they will receive a subsidy of 1.3 ch/kWh on top of the market price. Moreover, a fee of 0.3 ch/ kWh is given to compensate balancing costs. Case 3: Repowering scheme on land. We assume the decommissioning of an old 450 kW turbine and the building of a new 2 MW wind-power installation on land in the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] (second repowering scheme). 12 We assume the annual production to be 2326 kWh/kW. The scheme introduces a repowering certificate equivalent to 1.6 ch/kWh for two times the decommissioned capacity for 12,000 full-load hours. Besides the repowering certificate, the wind turbine is given the general subsidy of 1.3 ch/ kWh and the balancing fee of 0.3 ch/kWh. The subsidy is restricted so as the sum of the repowering subsidy, the general subsidy of 1.3 ch/kWh and the spot price cannot exceed 6.4 ch/kWh. Up to this price level subsidies are gradually reduced. Case 4: Existing offshore wind farms. This case is based on the two existing offshore wind farms. One is Horns Reef I producing from 2002 and having a total capacity of 160 MW. The other is Nysted I with a total capacity of 166 MW and going into production in 2003. The capacity of each turbine is 2-2.3 MW. Up to the production limit of 42,000 flhs both wind farms receive a feed-in tariff of 6.1 ch/kWh (including compensation for balancing of 0.3 ch/kWh). Assuming an annual production of 3,812 kWh/ kW 13 the owners will receive the feed-in tariff for about 11 years.
Thereafter, the owners will receive the spot price and a subsidy of 1.6 ch/kWh. The sum of the spot price and the subsidy cannot exceed 4.8 ch/kWh. If the spot price exceeds 4.8 ch/kWh, the turbine will not receive a subsidy. Case 5: New offshore wind farms. This case is a development of the existing wind farm Nysted-Rødsand I included in case 4. Development of Nysted-Rødsand II was planned to take place in 2009, but because of the withdrawal of the original project partners it will probably be delayed. The total capacity is still expected to be approx. 225 MW. The original tendering included the following conditions: Up to the production limit of 50,000 flhs the owner will receive a feed-in tariff of 6.7 ch/kWh (including compensation for balancing of 0.3 ch/kWh). Assuming an annual production of 3812 kWh/kW 14 the owners will receive this feed-in tariff for about 13 years. Thereafter, the owners will receive the spot price and a compensation for balancing of 0.3 ch/kWh. The cases considered include new as well as old wind turbines. This to illustrate how politics have been designed to benefit owners of wind turbines erected before the electricity reform has been decided and investors interested to invest in new wind turbines. From a pure efficiency point of view one could of course argue that subsidies should only be directed to new investments. But pure efficiency has not been the only aim of the Danish electricity reform.
The cases are illustrated in Fig. 2 . Fig. 2 shows a general transition to market price over the lifetime of the wind turbine. The figure also shows very different tariffs with regard to level as well as the length of the transition period. Highest initial prices (feed-in tariffs) are given to old wind-power installations on land, i.e. wind turbines erected before the electricity reform was decided. On the other hand, lowest tariffs are faced by the owners of new wind-power installations on land. Over the lifetime of the wind turbine all tariffs include the adaptation to the market price plus a premium between 0.3 and 1.6 ch/kWh. Over the whole lifetime owners of old wind-power installations or offshore wind farms benefit from the highest average price as well as from a price guarantee, which is effective in the beginning of the production period. This conclusion will be considered in more detail in Section 3.3.
Payments, subsidies, price impact and incentives to invest
The liberalisation of the Danish power market has turned up into a compromise between consumer interest in lower electricity prices and wind-power producer interest to maintain the high pre-reform feed-in tariff. With regard to wind power, is assumed to be ch 2.8/kWh, which is equivalent to the average 2000-2006 price level on the Nordpool power market (system price). The ranking of the tariffs will off course depend on the actual market price as the subsidy part of the tariff in cases 3 and 4 is reduced when the market price exceeds a certain threshold.
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11 Production is based on statistics from the Danish Energy Authority. Annual production per kW has been calculated as an average of a historical time series of production data for specific wind-power capacities. Corrections have been made for variations in the wind speed between different years. 12 The costs of decommissioning old turbines are not included in the calculations. 13 Production is based on statistics from Danish Energy Authority. Annual production per kW has been calculated as an average of a historical time series of production data for specific wind-power capacities. Corrections have been made for variations in the wind speed between different years.
14 Production is assumed to be identical to the existing wind farms, Horns Reef I and Nysted-Rødsand I.
liberalisation is neither an immediate transition to market prices nor the continuation of high feed-in tariffs, but a smooth transition to a market scenario. As shown in Fig. 2 tariffs are adapted to the market price, in most cases over a considerable range of time.
In this section we will have a closer look at the price impact of the redesign of wind-power policy measures. We will also analyse whether the new tariffs give potential producers an incentive to invest in new wind-power installations and whether old investors have payoff from past investments.
We will, first, compare the payment to wind-power producers with the spot-market price. Second, we estimate the subsidy paid to the wind-power producers and analyses if larger amounts of wind power have an impact on the power spot price. Third, we compare the revenue from wind-power production with the costs of production in order to assess whether an incentive exists to invest in wind power.
Payments and subsidies to power producers
Initially, a definition might be useful to the reader. We define
Eq.
(1) says that wind-power producers receive a payment from the TSO equal to the electricity spot-market price plus a subsidy paid by the electricity customers. The subsidy is the total difference between the tariffs given to the producers and the market price. Table 2 shows the development over the period 2000-2006 in wind-power production and payments from the TSO to the windpower producers. In order to assess the subsidy level, the Nordpool market price is shown for the period 2000-2006. Fig. 4 shows the development of the Nordpool spot-market price forecasted until 2025.
From 2000 to 2006 wind-power production increased by 36%, whereas payments to wind-power producers only increased by 29% due to the effects of the transition programme. As seen from Table 2 the price per kWh paid for wind-power production has decreased since the implementation of the electricity reform from average ch 7.9 in 2000 to ch 6.1 in 2006. In contrast to this the market price of electricity has increased over the period, which implies that the subsidy gap (i.e. excess price) paid to wind-power producers has been reduced over the period. In the years to come a further decrease in the subsidy gap might be expected as more wind turbines will leave the transition programme over the next decade and adapt to market-price level.
Price impact faced by electricity consumers
What is the consumer price impact of the subsidies given to wind-power producers? This question is split up into two: (1) How much would the consumer price be reduced if Danish electricity customers had the opportunity to buy all electricity on the Nordpool power market? (2) Does wind power have an impact on the spot-market price?
By comparing the actual price paid by the electricity customer with the estimated market price without taking wind-power production into account one gets an indication of the price impact of the subsidies included in the wind-power tariffs. The results of that scenario are shown in Table 3 for the period 2001-2006. It appears from the table that after the reform the subsidy paid by electricity customers to wind-power producers has been pretty stable around 0.6-0.7 ch/kWh with the exception of 2006, where the subsidy was significantly reduced because of high spot prices. In the same period the market price has increased from 2.3 to 4.9 ch/kWh (cf. Table 2 ). Consequently, the share of the subsidy as compared to the market price has been reduced.
In Western Denmark (Jutland and Funen) wind power covers approximately 25% of the total power production 15 and can therefore influence the prices on the power market. Wind power has low marginal production costs compared to conventional Energinet.dk (2007) . a Payment to power producers is the total revenue received by the wind-power producers from the transmission system operator. Table 3 Subsidies from electricity customers to wind-power producers compared to reduced market prices because of wind generated electricity production technologies and are therefore able to penetrate high marginal cost units in the power system, resulting in a lower market price. The price impact is high in periods with high wind speed as well as in areas suffering from congestions in the power transmission capacity. Thus, if the available transmission capacity cannot cope with the required power export, the supply area is separated from the rest of the power market and constitutes its own pricing area. In most cases, this will lead to a lower power price in this sub-market compared to the rest of the market. Analyses have been carried out in order to calculate the impacts of wind-power production on the spot-market price of electricity in Western and Eastern Denmark (Østergaard et al., 2006) . The approach utilized is illustrated in Fig. 3 , which shows how the large capacity of wind power in Western Denmark has affected the spot-market price in December 2005. Five levels of wind-power production and the corresponding power prices are depicted for each hour of the average day during December 2005. The ''0-150 MW'' graph approximates those hours of the month, where the wind did not blow. Thus, this graph expectedly should show the prices for an average day in December 2005, if there was no wind-generated electricity in the power system. This graph represents the reference level for the analyses. As shown, the higher the wind-power production, the lower the spot power price in this area. At very high levels of wind-power production, the power price is reduced significantly in the daytime, while it is almost the same in the nighttime. This reflects the peak periods in the daytime with high demand of electricity and consequently wind power is replacing conventional power units with high marginal costs, while demand is lower in the nighttime, wind power thus substituting units with significantly lower marginal costs.
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Then, for each hour the difference is calculated between the above-mentioned reference level (no or low wind-power production) and the levels with higher production of wind power and consequentially lower spot-market prices in general. Summing the calculated amounts for all hours of the year adds up to the total benefit for power consumers of wind power lowering the spot prices.
Calculations show that the consumer electricity price Danish consumers benefit from congestion in transmission capacity. In periods with high wind-power production this leads to lower electricity prices in Denmark (not at least in Western Denmark) compared to the rest of the Nordic power market.
Internal rate of return of wind-power production
To analyse the profit of wind-power production we have calculated the internal rate of return (IRR) from investments in the five cases of wind-power production defined in Section 2.4. In order to illustrate how much the investment is exposed to changes in the market price of electricity we have calculated the IRR for each of the Nordpool price forecasts shown in Fig. 4 . Results are shown in Table 4 .
A lifetime of 20 years has been assumed for the wind-power installations. Assumptions about specific cost of production are documented in Appendix A.
The Nordpool spot market forecast has been supplied by the Danish Energy Authority. In Fig. 4 Concerning the liberalisation of the Danish power market and the redesign of policy schemes to support wind power, a number of conclusions can be drawn from Table 4 . All considered policy schemes directed towards new power investments give incentives to invest in new wind-power plants. Compared to a discount rate of 6% p.a. in real terms all schemes seem to include a reasonable risk premium of 3-5%.
Forecasting the electricity price 20 years ahead involves of course a lot of uncertainty strongly influencing investors' risk perception. Sensitivity analyses on the electricity price development show quite marked differences between the IRR of the schemes. The policy schemes directed towards new wind power on land (cases 2 and 3) are exposed to low IRR in the low electricity price scenario, actually so low that investors might incur losses if investments have to be financed by external financial sources. The policy schemes directed towards existing wind-power installations on land and offshore (cases 1 and 4) and directed towards new offshore wind farms (case 5) are much more robust in the case of low electricity prices in the future. This is especially true for old wind-power installations having a price guarantee (feed-in tariff) for a 10-year transition period. The transition scheme guarantees owners of old wind-power installations a robust rate of return almost independent of the development in the future market prices of electricity.
Due to higher investment and operational costs rate of return (IRR) on new offshore wind farms is lower than on existing offshore wind farms. New offshore wind farms face a fairly low rate of return in the low electricity price scenario of 7% p.a. compared to the reference discount rate of 6% p.a. At the same time it should be taken into account that the investor risk premium is expected to be considerably higher offshore than on land.
It is worth noticing that when electricity prices are high the repowering scheme results in a lower IRR than the general scheme for new wind power on land (market price+ch 1.3). This is due to the restriction on the subsidy, implying that the subsidy is reduced when the electricity price exceeds a given limit. Also the subsidy given to existing offshore wind farms includes this reduction mechanism. The aim of this mechanism is of course to reduce or eliminate the subsidy when electricity prices are high enough to make investments profitable.
Conclusion
The Danish electricity reform introduced a redesign of the policy measures directed towards wind power. A general high feed-in tariff was replaced by a variety of tariffs aiming to smooth the transition from the pre-reform price guarantee to the Nordpool market price. The new tariffs distinguish between e.g. ownership, time of installation and location (land versus offshore). The tariffs are characterised by a transition period followed by an adaptation to market-price level. In the transition period stated in years or full-load hours, the producer is offered a fixed feed-in tariff above market-price level. Thereafter, he has to adapt to a market-price level plus a subsidy in the range of 0.3-1.3 ch/kWh.
The new wind-power tariffs seem to be a political compromise between consumer interest in lower electricity prices and producer interest in making a profit. The tariffs imply an annual subsidy of h billion 0.1-0.3 paid by the electricity customers to the wind-power producers. To some extent this subsidy is compensated by reduced electricity market prices originating from low marginal production costs of wind power. Taking both effects into account the analysis included in this paper indicates that consumer prices are ch 0.05-0.6 higher due to production from Danish wind-power installations as compared to a scenario without wind-power production.
We conclude that producer subsidies included in the new tariffs give incentives to invest in new wind-power installations if the Danish Energy Authority's long-term forecast of power prices is to be believed in. However, risk aversive investors could be reluctant to invest especially in wind power on land as those investments are exposed to a rate of return below return of financial assets when electricity prices are low. But also new investments in offshore wind farms show low rates of return, leaving room for only a low-risk premium in the low-power price scenario.
Our analysis therefore points to expectations of future power prices to be a key parameter for the development of wind power. In general, the tariffs for new wind turbines could not by itself make evidence for the actual Danish recession in new windpower installations after the electricity reform. The main causes could include a combination of too few available sites for new turbines on land-due to problems in spatial planning-high risk aversion of new wind turbine owners in Denmark and perhaps more favourable policy schemes to promote wind-power investments in other countries. 
